911 Memorial & Museum 25 Years Later
The National September 11 Memorial & Museum in New York City is operated as a private 501(c)(3) non-profit organization rather than a direct government agency, though it works closely with federal, state, and local government entities.
USITC Makes Determinations in Five-Year (Sunset) Review Concerning Standard Steel Welded Wire Mesh from Mexico - USITC
The U.S. International Trade Commission Commission (USITC) today determined that revoking the existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on standard steel welded wire mesh from Mexico would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.
As a result of the USITC’s affirmative determinations, the existing orders on imports of this product from Mexico will remain in place.
Chairman Brett W. Doyle and Commissioners Jason E. Kearns, Peter-Anthony Pappas, Bart Thanhauser, and David Foley Jr. voted in the affirmative. Commissioner Samuel T. Negatu did not participate in the vote.
Today’s action comes under the five-year (sunset) review process required by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See the attached page for background on these five-year (sunset) reviews.
The USITC’s public report, Standard Steel Welded Wire Mesh from Mexico (Inv. Nos. 701-TA-653 and 731-TA-1527 (Review), USITC Publication 5791, September 2026), will contain the views of the USITC and information developed during the reviews.
The report will be available on the USITC website by October 22, 2026.
BACKGROUND
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act requires the Department of Commerce to revoke an antidumping or countervailing duty order, or terminate a suspension agreement, after five years unless the Department of Commerce and the USITC determine that revoking the order or terminating the suspension agreement would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping or subsidies (Commerce) and of material injury (USITC) within a reasonably foreseeable time.
The USITC’s institution notice in five-year reviews requests that interested parties file responses with the Commission concerning the likely effects of revoking the order under review as well as other information. Generally, within 95 days from institution, the Commission will determine whether the responses it has received reflect an adequate or inadequate level of interest in a full review. If responses to the USITC’s notice of institution are adequate, or if other circumstances warrant a full review, the Commission conducts a full review, which includes a public hearing and issuance of questionnaires.
The USITC generally does not hold a hearing or conduct further investigative activities in expedited reviews. Commissioners base their injury determination in expedited reviews on the facts available, including the Commission’s prior injury and review determinations, responses received to its notice of institution, data collected by staff in connection with the reviews, and information provided by the Department of Commerce.
The five-year (sunset) reviews concerning Standard Steel Welded Wire Mesh from Mexico were instituted on March 2, 2026.
On June 5, 2026, the USITC determined to conduct expedited five-year reviews. Commissioners David S. Johanson, Jason E. Kearns, and Amy A. Karpel concluded that the domestic interested party group responses were adequate and the respondent interested party group responses were inadequate, and voted for expedited reviews. Chairman Brett W. Doyle and Commissioners Peter-Anthony Pappas, Bart Thanhauser, David Foley Jr., and Samuel T. Negatu did not participate in the adequacy votes, as they were not members of the USITC at the time.
A record of the USITC’s vote to conduct expedited reviews is available on the investigations page for Standard Steel Welded Wire Mesh from Mexico; Inv. No. 701-TA-653 and 731-TA-1527 (Review).
________________________________________________________________________________
Baltimore CBP officers Seize $142k in Clandestinely Imported Plywood from China - USCBP
[Release Date Tue, 09/08/2026]
BALTIMORE – U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers seized a shipment of over 8,500 falcata plywood sheets in Baltimore on Aug. 27 that were imported using a stolen identity, were undervalued, and were clandestinely imported from China.
CBP valued the shipment at $142,372.
CBP officers initially inspected the shipment on July 9. The importer declared that the shipment was sourced from Indonesia and was valued at nearly $19,000. It was destined to an address near Denver. Officers detained the shipment for further investigation.
CBP officers learned that the importer of record used a fraudulent identity on import documentation and tampered with the shipping invoice. The victim of the identity fraud confirmed that they did not order the plywood, and they were not associated with the importing company. Officers also determined that the plywood originated in China and was subject to antidumping and countervailing duties.
Importing China-origin goods transshipped through third countries to evade anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws is illegal.
CBP officers seized the falcata plywood as smuggled or clandestinely introduced merchandise [19 USC 1595a(c)(1)(A)].
An investigation continues.
“Customs and Border Protection officers continue to crack down on illegal trade practices, such as commodities imported using stolen identities to mask the true importer, and transshipping misclassified and undervalued imports through third nations in a duty evasion scheme,” said Adam Rottman, CBP’s Area Port Director in Baltimore. “CBP remains committed to protecting our nation’s economic security, and American businesses and workers by combatting criminal enterprises that brazenly violate our nation’s trade laws.”
Antidumping and countervailing duty laws level the playing field for U.S. companies by preventing foreign producers from flooding U.S. markets with goods sold below fair value or that are propped up by unfair subsidies.
CBP officers conduct a robust trade enforcement approach to detect shipments that dodge antidumping and countervailing duties and third country transshipment practices that attempt to circumnavigate duty.
CBP's border security mission is led at our nation’s Ports of Entry by CBP officers and agriculture specialists from the Office of Field Operations. CBP screens international travelers and cargo for illicit narcotics, unreported currency, weapons, and other prohibited items that threaten public safety and our nation’s economic vitality.
________________________________________________________________________________
Federal Register Notices:
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Certain Walk-Behind Lawn Mowers and Parts Thereof From the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Results of Sunset Review and Revocation of Orders
• Brass Rod From Brazil: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2023-2025
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Steel Grating From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited Third Sunset Review of the Countervailing Duty Order
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand From Ukraine: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2024-2025
• Brass Rod From the Republic of Korea: Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2023-2024
• Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand From Malaysia: Preliminary Results and Rescission, in Part, of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2024-2025
• Certain Cased Pencils From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2024-2025
________________________________________________________________________________
In the News:
• Breaking down the U.S.-Canada trade war in 4 charts [NBC News]
• Alcohol, motorcycles, molasses: What Canadian goods has Trump said he’ll ban? [Th Washington Post]
• As the U.S. and Canada slap new tariffs on goods, American farmers are stuck in the middle [IPM News]
________________________________________________________________________________
Treasury Grounds Iranian Airlines with Sweeping Sanctions Action - US Treasury Department
Operation Economic Outcast Targets All Remaining Iranian Airlines
WASHINGTON— Today, (September 8, 2026) under Operation Economic Outcast, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 36 targets for supporting Iran’s aviation sector, which the regime uses to move weapons, personnel, and illicit cargo. Today’s action also targeted covert front companies, foreign intermediaries, and deceptive transshipment routes that Iran relies on to obtain U.S.-origin aircraft and sensitive technology. In addition to OFAC’s action, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing an Alert asking financial institutions to report procurement networks supporting Iran’s aviation industry.
“Under Operation Economic Outcast, we promised severe consequences for those providing financial lifelines to the Iranian regime,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Today, we followed through on that promise with sanctions on companies that continue to support Mahan Air. Let this be a warning to anyone doing business with Iran’s remaining airlines, all of which we sanctioned today: You are at risk of being cut off from the global financial system.”
As part of this action, OFAC is also targeting third-country firms that facilitate U.S.-sanctioned Mahan Air’s proliferation activity, terrorist-linked flight operations, and illicit procurement of U.S.-origin aircraft. Concurrently, OFAC is suspending three Iran-related aviation authorizations to put additional pressure on the Iranian regime. These include authorizations that allowed for overflights, and for non-U.S. airlines to fly U.S.-origin or U.S.-controlled commercial aircraft into Iran. OFAC will consider aviation safety-related requests on a case-by-case basis.
Any foreign firm or individual enabling sanctioned Iranian airlines—including through aircraft transfers, cargo services, or general sales agent support—will face serious consequences for supporting the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. As Secretary Bessent has stated, Operation Economic Outcast will sever the economic lifelines that sustain the Iranian regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) via a sustained and systematic campaign to close every financial resource, including the aviation sector, that supports the leading state sponsor of terror. Any person that assists Iran’s aviation sector, from the provision of general sales agent services through to support to Iran’s covert aircraft procurement schemes, will be held accountable.
OFAC is taking this action pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, and E.O. 13902, which targets certain sectors of the Iranian economy. This action leverages the August 24, 2026 aviation sector determination under E.O. 13902 to sanction the remaining active Iranian airlines and intensify efforts to isolate Iran’s terrorist regime from the global financial system. It also builds on OFAC’s April and July 2026 sanctions actions targeting persons servicing Mahan Air’s domestic and international flights.
On October 12, 2011, OFAC designated Mahan Air pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing financial, material, and technological support to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which OFAC designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2007 for providing support to multiple terrorist organizations. In December 2019, the U.S. Department of State designated Mahan Air pursuant to E.O. 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters.
OPERATION ECONOMIC OUTCAST IS ISOLATING THE IRANIAN REGIME
Announced by Secretary Bessent on August 24, 2026, dubbed Economic D-Day, Operation Economic Outcast is severing the remaining economic lifelines that sustain the Iranian regime. Treasury has mapped the networks, facilitators, and financial channels that Iran uses to smuggle oil, evade sanctions, and fund terror. Working with partners across the U.S. government, the European Union, United Kingdom, Gulf partners, and others, Treasury is targeting any source of the regime’s illicit revenue.
Treasury warned that any entity facilitating money laundering or sanctions evasion on behalf of Iran risks being cut off from the U.S. financial system. It also expands secondary sanctions exposure for those who continue doing business with the Iranian regime and will accelerate the pace of U.S. enforcement. More information on Operation Economic Outcast is available here.
IRANIAN AIRLINES
Iran’s commercial airlines have long supported the Iranian regime’s destabilizing activities, with the IRGC using ostensibly private airlines, such as Mahan Air, for the procurement and transport of weapons and the ferrying of personnel. On August 24, 2026, Economic D-Day, Treasury issued determinations against critical sectors––including aviation––that the Iranian regime uses to try to prop up its failing economy. Today, OFAC is announcing its inaugural designations of Iranian airlines pursuant to this determination.
OFAC is designating the following 27 Iranian airlines pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the aviation sector of the Iranian economy:
Air Shiraz
Asa Jet Airline
Ata Airlines Company
Atlas Aviation Group
Ava Airlines
Chabahar Airlines Company
Erwan Airline Company
Fly Kish Airlines
Fly Persia Airlines
Iran Air Tour
Iran Aseman Airlines
Jsky Airlines
Kish Airlines
Karun Airlines Company
Lad Airways
Mehr Airways
Nasim Air
Pars Oghyanous Kish Company
Qeshm Air
Raimon Airways
Saha Airlines
Sepehran Airlines
Soroush Air
Taban Airlines
Toos Airlines
Varesh Airlines
Zagros Airlines
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
As identified in past OFAC advisories, Iran has long engaged in deceptive practices with respect to aviation, to include the use of front companies and other pass-through entities in third countries to obfuscate the ultimate Iranian end-user of U.S.-origin aircraft and aviation-related materials. The civil aviation industry should be alert to deceptive practices used by some Iranian persons, designated airlines, and their agents or affiliates to acquire U.S.-origin aircraft or related goods, technology, or services subject to U.S. jurisdiction in violation of U.S. sanctions.
Today’s FinCEN Alert underscores these risks for financial institutions, as well, highlighting several key red flag indicators to help them detect, prevent, and report potentially suspicious activity involving Iran’s efforts to procure aircraft and aircraft parts.
In summer 2026, Mahan Air received at least three B-777 aircraft that were diverted through the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. UAE-based ECT Aviation Support LLC (ECT Aviation Support UAE) and Türkiye-based Sky Phoenix Hava Yollari Tasimaciligi Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Sky Phoenix) served as intermediaries in the scheme to transfer U.S. origin aircraft to Mahan Air. Each aircraft originated from a retired fleet before passing through ECT Aviation Support UAE, where they received temporary registrations. The transfer route closely mirrored previous sanctions evasion operations for Mahan Air.
UAE-based Egyptian national Ibrahim Ali Mohamed Mohamed Mahran (Mahran) is the chief executive officer, managing director, founder, and owner of ECT Aviation Support UAE. United Kingdom (UK)-based ECT Aviation Support LTD (ECT Aviation Support UK) is wholly owned by ECT Aviation Support UAE, which is owned by Mahran. Mahran is also the director of ECT Aviation Support UK and has served as its director since the company’s establishment.
UAE-based Aerobravo Airplane Management and Operation LLC (Aerobravo Airplane Management) has acted as the operator for aircraft owned by ECT Aviation Support UAE.
ECT Aviation Support UAE and Sky Phoenix are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mahan Air. Mahran is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being a leader or official of ECT Aviation Support UAE. ECT Aviation Support UK is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mahran. Aerobravo Airplane Management is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, ECT Aviation Support UAE.
CARGO SERVICES PROVIDERS AND GENERAL SALES AGENTS
Lastly, OFAC is taking action against cargo service providers and general sales agents that have serviced Mahan Air’s international flights. General sales agents provide a range of services to airlines, including sales and customer support services and coordination with freight forwarders and shippers on the airline’s behalf.
Türkiye-based S Sistem Lojistik Hizmetler Anonim Sirketi (S Sistem) has coordinated shipments, including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components and industrial equipment destined for Iran, on behalf of Mahan Air. Türkiye-based Mes Cargo Transportation Tourism and Foreign Trade Limited Company (Mes Cargo) is serving as a general sales agent for Mahan Air and has coordinated shipments on behalf of Mahan Air.
Malaysia-based Icargo SDN BHD (Icargo) has served as a general sales agent for Mahan Air and has coordinated the shipment of U.S.-origin parts to Iran on Mahan Air’s behalf. Kazakhstan-based Tour Invest LLC (Tour Invest) has served as a general sales agent for Mahan Air.
S Sistem, Mes Cargo, Icargo, and Tour Invest are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mahan Air.
FINCEN’S ALERT TO COUNTER IRANIAN PROCUREMENT EFFORTS FOR ITS COMMERCIAL AVIATION INDUSTRY
FinCEN’s Alert to Counter Iranian Procurement Efforts for its Commercial Aviation Industry contains red flags and typologies to help financial institutions detect, prevent, and report suspicious activity potentially involving Iran’s procurement of aircraft and aircraft parts, including when Iran’s direct involvement is not readily identifiable in transaction details. Iran employs deceptive schemes to illicitly procure U.S.- and Western-origin aircraft and aircraft parts. Iranian airlines procure aircraft, as well as needed parts and services, using front companies in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Front companies posing as technology, aviation, or logistics companies in third-country jurisdictions will also often purchase aircraft components and related dual-use items from the United States or other Western countries for subsequent export to Iran. FinCEN encourages U.S. financial institutions to remain vigilant for suspicious activity that may be connected to Iranian aviation sector procurement networks and to report it immediately to FinCEN.
FinCEN’s alert is available at FinCEN.gov.
For questions on this Alert, please contact FinCEN at http://www.fincen.gov/contact.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
Click here for more information on the persons designated today.