Petitions Filed Requesting the Imposition of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Imports of Ceramic Tile from India - Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP
On April 19, 2024, the Coalition for Fair Trade in Ceramic Tile filed a petition for the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties on the imports of ceramic tile from India. The petition alleges dumping margins of 407.78% to 827.60%.
The merchandise covered by these investigations is ceramic flooring tile, wall tile, paving tile, hearth tile, porcelain tile, mosaic tile, flags, finishing tile, and the like (hereinafter ceramic tile). Ceramic tiles are articles containing a mixture of minerals including clay (generally hydrous silicates of alumina or magnesium) that are fired so the raw materials are fused to produce a finished good that is less than 3.2 cm in actual thickness. All ceramic tile is subject to the scope regardless of end use, surface area, and weight, regardless of whether the tile is glazed or unglazed, regardless of the water absorption coefficient by weight, regardless of the extent of vitrification, and regardless of whether or not the tile is on a backing. The petition provides additional detailed scope description and specific product exclusions.
The projected date of International Trade Commission’s Preliminary Conference is May 10, 2024. The earliest theoretical date for retroactive suspension of liquidation for AD is June 28, 2024; CVD is May 9, 2024.
Please feel free to contact one of our attorneys for further information, including a complete scope description, complete projected schedule for the AD and CVD investigations; and the volume and value of imports.
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Petitions for the Imposition of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Imports of Certain Alkyl Phosphate Esters from the People’s Republic of China - Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP
On April 23, 2024, the ICL-IP America, Inc., a subsidiary of the ICL Group (“ICL”) filed a petition for the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties on the imports of certain Alkyl Phosphate Esters from the People’s Republic of China. The petition alleges Chinese dumping margins of 45.1% to 68.4%. The petition identifies certain foreign producers/exporters of the investigated product.
The merchandise covered by these investigations are Alkyl phosphate esters based exclusively on side chains with a length of two or three carbon atoms (also includes chlorinated alkyl chains) and with a phosphorus content of at least 6.5% (per weight) and a viscosity between 1 and 2000 mPa.s (at 20-25 °C). Alkyl phosphate esters include Tris (2-chloroisopropyl) phosphate (TCPP), Tris (1,3-dichloroisopropyl) phosphate (TDCP), and Triethyl Phosphate (TEP). TCPP is also known as Tris (1-chloro-2-propyl) phosphate, Tris (1-chloropropan-2-yl) phosphate, Tris (monochloroisopropyl) phosphate (TMCP), and Tris (2-chloroisopropyl) phosphate (TCIP). It has the chemical formula C9H18Cl3O4P and the CAS Nos. 1244733-77-4 and 13674-84-5. It may also be identified as CAS No. 6145-73-9. TDCP is also known as Tris (1,3-dichloroisopropyl) phosphate, Tris (1,3-dichloro-2-propyl) phosphate, Chlorinated tris, tris {2-chloro-1-(chloromethyl ethyl} phosphate, TDCPP, and TDCIPP. It has the chemical formula C9H15Cl6O4P and the CAS No. 13674-87-8. TEP is also known as Phosphoric acid triethyl ester, phosphoric ester, flame retardant TEP, Tris(ethyl) phosphate, Triethoxyphosphine oxide, and Ethyl phosphate (neutral). It has the chemical formula (C2H5O)3PO and the CAS No. 78-40-0. Also included in this investigation are isomers of the foregoing products and blends including one or more alkyl phosphate esters where the alkyl phosphate esters account for 20 percent or more of the blend by weight.
The projected date of International Trade Commission’s Preliminary Conference is May 13, 2024. The earliest theoretical date for retroactive suspension of liquidation for AD is July 2, 2024; CVD is May 13, 2024.
Please feel free to contact one of our attorneys for further information, including a complete scope description, complete projected schedule for the AD and CVD investigations; the volume and value of imports; and list of identified foreign exporters. Petitioner has not filed U.S. importer information.
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USTR Releases 2024 Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement - U.S. Trade Representative
WASHINGTON – The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) today released its 2024 Special 301 Report on the adequacy and effectiveness of U.S. trading partners’ protection and enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights.
“Many of the issues highlighted in the Special 301 Report demand collaborative efforts from our allies and partners,” said Ambassador Katherine Tai. “Many of my counterparts share the goal of making sure that trade supports the interests of our people, and one of the most dangerous types of IP violations involves counterfeit goods that pose health and safety risks. In addition, the Biden-Harris Administration has continued its policy of declining to call out countries for exercising TRIPS flexibilities, including with respect to compulsory licenses, in a manner consistent with TRIPS obligations.”
This annual report details USTR’s findings in a review of more than 100 trading partners after significant research and enhanced engagement with stakeholders. Key elements of the 2024 Special 301 Report include:
• The report highlights progress made by our trading partners to resolve and address IP issues of concern to the United States:
o USTR removed the Dominican Republic from the Watch List this year for significant progress on addressing concerns with IP enforcement and transparency. Dominican Republic agencies increased enforcement actions and interagency cooperation on combating signal piracy, improved resource allocation for agencies, made publicly available enforcement-related statistics, increased the number of specialized IP prosecutors, increased enforcement actions against counterfeit medicines, and worked with various U.S. agencies to receive training and technical assistance. The Dominican Republic has committed to continue taking enforcement actions to combat copyright infringement, including signal piracy, and to increase capacity through training and engagement with the United States.
o USTR also removed Uzbekistan from the Watch List this year due to sustained progress on long-standing issues pertaining to IP protection and enforcement. For example, Uzbekistan enacted new Customs Code amendments that introduce ex officio authority to suspend and seize counterfeit imports and exports. Uzbekistan also continues to give high-level political attention to IP, including support for and participation in the Intellectual Property Working Group under the United States-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.
• The Special 301 review of Ukraine continues to be suspended due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
• USTR placed seven countries on the Priority Watch List, indicating that serious problems exist in that country with respect to IP protection, enforcement, or market access for U.S. persons relying on IP:
o For example, there remain many serious concerns regarding IP protection and enforcement in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 2023, the pace of reforms in the PRC remained slow. Stakeholders continue to raise concerns about implementation of the amended Patent Law, Copyright Law, and Criminal Law, as well as about long-standing issues like technology transfer, trade secrets, bad faith trademarks, counterfeiting, online piracy, and geographical indications. Also, statements by Chinese officials that tie IP rights to Chinese market dominance still raise strong concerns. The United States continues to monitor closely the PRC’s progress in implementing its commitments under the United States-China Economic and Trade Agreement (Phase One Agreement).
o In addition, while there has been progress under the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum in addressing certain issues with trademark infringement investigations and pre-grant opposition proceedings, numerous long-standing concerns remain. These include inadequate IP enforcement, including high rates of online piracy, an extensive trademark opposition backlog, and insufficient legal means to protect trade secrets. Among other things, India still needs to fully implement the WIPO Internet Treaties and to ensure that copyright statutory licenses do not extend to interactive transmissions.
• The report also details concerns and developments in 20 countries that USTR placed on the Watch List:
o For example, the report explains concerns regarding IP protection and, in particular, enforcement in Vietnam. Vietnam has increasingly become a leading source of online piracy and currently hosts some of the most popular piracy sites and services in the world that target a global audience. Despite having criminal laws for copyright and trademark infringement, Vietnam has almost no criminal investigations or prosecutions.
o Also, Mexico needs to fully implement the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), including the obligations regarding IP with transition periods that end in 2024 and 2025. The report also details concerns regarding the high prevalence of online piracy and counterfeit goods.
• Cross-cutting issues highlighted in the report include:
o This Administration recognizes that counterfeit products, including counterfeit medicines, can pose harms to the citizens of the trading partners where those counterfeit products are consumed. In that regard, appropriate enforcement can also serve the interests of foreign governments. The Report calls for adequate and effective enforcement against trademark counterfeiting, which plays a key role in reducing the potential health and safety risks due to counterfeit products.
o On IP and public health, the United States continues to respect its trading partners’ rights to grant compulsory licenses in a manner consistent with the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and the Doha Declaration. The United States also recognizes that the TRIPS Agreement provides for additional flexibilities in public health emergencies and other circumstances of extreme urgency within a Member’s territory.
o The Report continues to highlight ongoing concerns related to online piracy and broadcast piracy. Examples include concerns related to stream-ripping, illicit streaming devices and related piracy apps, cable providers distributing pirated content, and illicit Internet Protocol television (IPTV) services. Stakeholders from both unions and companies in the creative sectors have underscored the importance of copyright protection and enforcement to their livelihoods and businesses.
o Concerns with the European Union’s aggressive promotion of its exclusionary geographical indications (GI) policies persist. The United States continues its intensive engagement in promoting and protecting access to foreign markets for U.S. exporters of products that are identified by common names or otherwise marketed under previously registered trademarks. The United States remains concerned about the proposed expansion of the EU GI system beyond agricultural products and foodstuffs to encompass non-agricultural products, including apparel, ceramics, glass, handicrafts, manufactured goods, minerals, salts, stones, and textiles.
o USTR also continues to engage trading partners to address concerns on IP protection and enforcement, including through bilateral engagement under Trade and Investment Frameworks (TIFAs) and through other mechanisms. Examples include engagements with Armenia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Paraguay, Peru, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
Read: BACKGROUND
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Federal Register Notices:
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Brass Rod From the Republic of Korea: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination
• Certain Non-Refillable Steel Cylinders From India: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination
• Multilayered Wood Flooring From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, Preliminary Determination of No Shipments, and Rescission of Review, in Part; 2021-2022; Withdrawal
• Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Determinations, Investigations, etc.: Dioctyl Terephthalate From Malaysia, Poland, Taiwan, and the Republic of Türkiye: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations
• Brass Rod From South Africa: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value
• Brass Rod From the Republic of Korea: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value
• Brass Rod From India: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value
• Brass Rod From Brazil: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value
• Brass Rod From Mexico: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Ferrosilicon From Brazil, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and the Russian Federation: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Certain Blood Flow Restriction Devices With Rotatable Windlasses and Components Thereof; Notice of a Commission Determination That the March 19, 2024, Initial Determination (Order No. 23) is an Order and Recommended Determination Rather Than an Initial Determination; Request for Written Submissions on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From Ecuador: Amended Preliminary Determination of Countervailing Duty Investigation
• Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet From Germany: Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe From the Republic of Korea; Oil Country Tubular Goods From the Republic of Korea; Welded Line Pipe From the Republic of Korea; and Large Diameter Welded Pipe From the Republic of Korea: Notice of Initiation of Antidumping Duty Changed Circumstances Reviews
• Truck and Bus Tires From People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Review of the Countervailing Duty Order
• Truck and Bus Tires From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Ceramic Tile From India; Institution of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations and Scheduling of Preliminary Phase Investigations
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Certain Fiber-Optic Connectors, Adapters, Jump Cables, Patch Cords, Products Containing the Same, and Components Thereof; Notice of Institution of Investigation
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Treasury Designates Iranian Cyber Actors Targeting U.S. Companies and Government Agencies - U.S. Customs & Border Protection
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two companies and four individuals involved in malicious cyber activity on behalf of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC). These actors targeted more than a dozen U.S. companies and government entities through cyber operations, including spear phishing and malware attacks. In conjunction with today’s action, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is unsealing an indictment against the four individuals for their roles in cyber activity targeting U.S. entities.
“Iranian malicious cyber actors continue to target U.S. companies and government entities in a coordinated, multi-pronged campaign intended to destabilize our critical infrastructure and cause harm to our citizens,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States will continue to leverage our whole-of-government approach to expose and disrupt these networks’ operations.”
Iranian cyber actors continue to target the United States using a wide range of malicious cyber activity, from conducting ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure to conducting spear phishing and other social engineering campaigns against individuals, companies, and government entities. The IRGC-CEC, one of the Iranian government organizations behind malicious cyber activity, works through a series of front companies to target the United States and several other countries. Although front company management and key personnel know their operations support the IRGC-CEC, much of the Iranian public is not aware that some companies in Iran, such as Mehrsam Andisheh Saz Nik, are used as front companies to support the IRGC-CEC. The Iranian public should be aware that the IRGC-CEC uses private companies and their employees to achieve illegal goals.
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. OFAC designated the IRGC-CEC, also known as the IRGC Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization, pursuant to E.O. 13606 on January 12, 2018, for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the IRGC, which itself was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 13, 2017. In February 2024, OFAC designated six IRGC-CEC officials in response to recent cyber operations in which IRGC-affiliated cyber actors manipulated programmable logic controllers, which impacted critical infrastructure systems, including in the United States. While these particular operations did not disrupt any critical services, unauthorized access to critical infrastructure systems can enable actions that harm the public and cause devasting humanitarian consequences.
IRGC-CEC FRONT COMPANIES AND AFFILIATED CYBER ACTORS - Mehrsam Andisheh Saz Nik (MASN), formerly known as Mahak Rayan Afzar, is an IRGC-CEC front company that has supported malicious cyber activity conducted by the IRGC-CEC. The company has been associated with multiple Iranian advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, including Tortoiseshell. The company is also associated with other malicious cyber activity, including a multi-year campaign targeting over a dozen U.S. companies and government entities, including the Department of the Treasury.
Alireza Shafie Nasab is an IRGC-CEC-affiliated cyber actor who was involved in the same multi-year cyber campaign targeting U.S. entities while employed by MASN’s predecessor, Mahak Rayan Afzar.
Reza Kazemifar Rahman (Kazemifar), another IRGC-CEC cyber actor, has been involved in operational testing of malware intended to target job seekers with a focus on military veterans. Kazemifar, while employed by MASN’s predecessor, Mahak Rayan Afzar, was also involved in the spear phishing campaign targeting multiple U.S. entities, including the Department of the Treasury.
IRGC-CEC front company Dadeh Afzar Arman (DAA) has also engaged in malicious cyber campaigns on behalf of the IRGC-CEC.
Hosein Mohammad Haruni was employed by DAA and has been associated with various spear phishing and other social engineering operations, in addition to malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. entities and the Department of the Treasury.
Komeil Baradaran Salmani has been associated with multiple IRGC-CEC front companies and involved in spear phishing campaigns targeting multiple U.S. entities, including Department of the Treasury.
Mehrsam Andisheh Saz Nik, Dadeh Afzar Arman, Alireza Shafie Nasab, Komeil Baradaran Salmani, and Reza Kazemifar Rahman are all being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-CEC. Hosein Mohammad Haruni is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Dadeh Afzar Arman.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS - As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned entities and individuals may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.
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OTEXA: Announcements - ITA
[04/25/2024] – Determination to Approve CAFTA-DR Commercial Availability Request for Certain Double-Knit Jacquard Fabric. File Number: CA2024001.
[04/23/2024] – USTR is initiating an investigation of acts, policies, and practices of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance. The Section 301 Committee will convene a public hearing on May 29 and is seeking public comments by May 22. For more information see 89 FR 29424.
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Imposition of Import Restrictions on Archaeological and Ethnological Material of Pakistan - Federal Register
AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security; Department of the Treasury.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: This document amends the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regulations to reflect the imposition of import restrictions on archaeological and ethnological materials from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Pakistan). These restrictions are imposed pursuant to an agreement between the United States and Pakistan, entered into under the authority of the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act. This document amends the CBP regulations, adding Pakistan to the list of countries which have bilateral agreements with the United States imposing cultural property import restrictions, and contains the Designated List, which describes the archaeological and ethnological materials to which the restrictions apply.
DATES: Effective on April 10, 2024
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: