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**Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics - Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP
The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) establishes a rebuttable presumption that the importation of any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China, or produced by certain entities, is prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and that such goods, wares, articles, and merchandise are not entitled to entry to the United States. The presumption applies unless the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) determines, through clear and convincing evidence, that the goods, wares, articles, or merchandise were not produced using forced labor or that UFLPA does not apply to the goods, wares, or merchandise seeking to be entered into the United States. The statistics provided below are shipments subjected to UFLPA reviews or enforcement actions.
For more information on the terms and metrics used in this dashboard, please view the data dictionary. To access more trade-related data, please visit the CBP Data Portal.
Note: The below charts are fully interactive. Clicking on chart elements will result in data filtering and produce metrics based on user selections.
Federal Register Notices:
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Certain Metal Lockers and Parts Thereof From the People's Republic of China: Initiation and Expedited Preliminary Results of Changed Circumstances Reviews, and Intent To Revoke the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, in Part
• Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand From Thailand: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2021
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Certain Graphics Systems, Components Thereof, and Digital Televisions Containing the Same; Notice of Request for Submissions on the Public Interest
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products From the Republic of Korea: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2021-2022
• Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires From Thailand: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2021-2022
• Forged Steel Fluid End Blocks From India: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2020-2021
• Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet From the People's Republic of China: Affirmative Final Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders; 4017 Aluminum Sheet
• Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada: Notice of Initiation of Changed Circumstances Review
• Welded Stainless Pressure Pipe From India: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2020-2021
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Certain Electronic Devices and Semiconductor Devices Having Wireless Communication Capabilities and Components Thereof; Institution of Investigation
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bar From Mexico: Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2020-2021
• Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts From Colombia: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2021-2022
Imposing Sanctions on Malian Officials in Connection with the Wagner Group - U.S. Department of State
Today (7/24/23), the United States is designating three Malian officials who have worked closely with the Wagner Group to facilitate and expand Wagner’s presence in Mali since December 2021. Civilian fatalities have surged by 278 percent since Wagner forces deployed to Mali in December 2021. Many of those deaths were the result of operations conducted by Malian Armed Forces alongside members of the Wagner Group.
The United States will continue to take action against those who facilitate the Wagner Group’s destabilizing activities, which pose threats to peace and security in Mali and the region. As the largest bilateral donor of development and humanitarian assistance to Mali, the United States supports the people of Mali in their aspirations for peace, prosperity, and democracy.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Malian Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara, Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra, and Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O) 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Wagner Group, a U.S.-designated entity, pursuant to E.O. 14024. For more information on today’s actions, see Treasury’s press release.
CBP Cautions Consumers, Merchants about Unsafe School Supplies - U.S. Customs & Border Protection
CBP and CPSC Seize School Supplies with Potentially Hazardous Substances in San Juan
SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico – U.S. Customs and Border Protection, along with the Consumer Product Safety Commission, seized a shipment of school supplies in San Juan, P.R., recently that violated federal law regulating misbranded hazardous substances or banned hazardous substances.
CBP officers inspected a shipment manifested as “School Supplies,” valued at more than $54,000. Officers observed that the products did not display the required Consumer Product Safety Act Tracking labels. Officers contacted a CPSC Inspector who corroborated the violation.
“The new school year is about to start. Distributors, retailers, and consumers should be aware of the quality and safety standards of the products that they import into the United States and its territories,” stated Efrain Rivas, Assistant Director of Field Operations for Trade at the San Juan Field Office. “In this case CBP, working very closely with our partners at CPSC, were able to protect consumers from these imported school supplies that could have potentially caused serious health and safety issues to children.”
The Federal Hazardous Substances Act (15 USC 1263) requires precautionary labeling on the immediate container of hazardous household products to help consumers safely store and use those products. This labeling includes directions to consumers on immediate first aid measures should an accidental exposure occur. The Act also allows the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to ban certain products that are so dangerous, or that the labeling is not adequate to protect consumers.
Import Safety is a CBP Priority Trade Issue and is designed to ensure that unsafe products do not enter the commerce of the United States. CBP remains committed to working collaboratively and collectively with partner government agencies, other foreign governments, and the trade industry to better define and assess risk. We do this through increased automation, the sharing of information, and an emphasis on partnerships and best practices to help protect the U.S. consumer.
FDA Provides Update Regarding Storm Damage at Pfizer Facility in North Carolina - Food & Drug Administration
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is working closely with Pfizer to assess the impact of the damage at Pfizer’s Rocky Mount, North Carolina, facility. Over the next few days, we will complete a more extensive assessment of the products that may be impacted and the current available supply of those products. This assessment also will evaluate what is in Pfizer’s other warehouses and what is stocked by wholesalers and distributors, if those companies are willing to share that information with the FDA.
Importantly, we do not expect there to be any immediate significant impacts on supply given the products are currently at hospitals and in the distribution system, but this is a dynamic situation and FDA staff are in frequent communication with Pfizer and other manufacturers. The FDA will work closely with partners in government, industry and the broader health care system to minimize impact on patient care.
Notably, while Pfizer has one third of the total sterile injectable drug market for hospitals in the U.S., and this facility only makes 25% of Pfizer’s total product for this market – not the entire market. This means 8% of U.S. consumption is supplied by this site. While disclosure laws prevent the FDA from providing a complete list of products made at the facility, there is redundancy in the supply chain due to other manufacturers. Our initial analysis has identified less than 10 drugs for which Pfizer’s North Carolina plant is the sole source for the U.S. market, however, a number of these are specific formulations for which there should be substitutes or for which many weeks’ worth of stock should be available in Pfizer’s other warehouses.
For those products produced at this facility that are already in, or may be, at risk of shortage, the FDA has initiated mitigation steps, such as looking for additional sources and asking other manufacturers to prepare to ramp up production, if needed.
To have equitable distribution of the products and ensure availability to those in most need, as well as to avoid hoarding, Pfizer has put the inventory of many products on strict allocation. These allocation measures could lead to localized supply disruptions depending on contractual relationships for supplies. Health care systems that have trouble in obtaining a particular drug should contact their distributor or Pfizer directly.
We will share additional information as it becomes available.
More broadly, this incident underscores that a robust, resilient and safe drug supply chain is essential for public health and national security. Redundancy of manufacturing locations, which can include domestic locations, and of suppliers is important to mitigate risks to supply that can occur from natural disasters, geopolitical conflicts, or other less predictable events.
We remain committed to partnering across government, academia, and industry to strengthen and diversify the supply chain and ensure Americans continue to have access to drugs that are high quality, safe and effective.
Virginia Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Conspiring to Violate Iranian Sanctions - U.S. Department of Justice
Behrouz Mokhtari, 72, of McLean, Virginia, was sentenced today to 41 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran by conspiring to engage in prohibited business activities on behalf of persons and entities in Iran. In addition, Mokhtari was ordered to forfeit approximately $2,862,598 in proceeds derived from his criminal activity as well as a residence he purchased in Campbell, California, for over $1.5 million using such proceeds.
Mokhtari pleaded guilty earlier this year in the District of Maryland to two counts of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economics Power ACT (IEEPA). According to court documents, Mokhtari engaged in a conspiracy lasting from at least March 2018 until at least September 2020 in which he conducted numerous business activities on behalf of Iranian entities without first obtaining the required licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). In a separate conspiracy lasting from about February 2013 until at least June 2017, Mokhtari and a number of Iranian nationals agreed to conduct illicit shipments of petrochemical products to and from Iran¬, utilizing his front company, East & West Shipping Inc., in Panama to do so.
Mokhtari held management positions and/or maintained ownership control of numerous businesses in Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), collectively referred to as “the FSR Network.” Using the FSR Network, he and his co-conspirators illegally provided services to Iranian entities such as the refinement and transport of petrochemical products. Mokhtari and his co-conspirators used FSR Network bank accounts in the UAE, including Bitubiz FZE, to process these U.S. dollar transactions.
Mokhtari admitted that he knew that, as a U.S. citizen, engaging in business with Iranian entities without first obtaining a license or permission from OFAC is prohibited. He further knew that it was illegal to engage in transactions intended to evade Iranian sanctions, or to engage in transactions related to goods and services of Iranian origin or export.
Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney Erek L. Barron for the District of Maryland and Special Agent in Charge Thomas J. Sobocinski of the FBI Baltimore Field Office made the announcement.
The FBI investigated the case.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kathleen O. Gavin for the District of Maryland prosecuted the case, with valuable assistance provided by the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.
FTC and HHS Warn Hospital Systems and Telehealth Providers about Privacy and Security Risks from Online Tracking Technologies - Federal Trade Commission
Letters highlight concerns stemming from use of technologies that may share a user’s sensitive health information
The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Office for Civil Rights (OCR) are cautioning hospitals and telehealth providers about the privacy and security risks related to the use of online tracking technologies integrated into their websites or mobile apps that may be impermissibly disclosing consumers’ sensitive personal health data to third parties.
“When consumers visit a hospital’s website or seek telehealth services, they should not have to worry that their most private and sensitive health information may be disclosed to advertisers and other unnamed, hidden third parties,” said Samuel Levine, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “The FTC is again serving notice that companies need to exercise extreme caution when using online tracking technologies and that we will continue doing everything in our powers to protect consumers’ health information from potential misuse and exploitation.”
“Although online tracking technologies can be used for beneficial purposes, patients and others should not have to sacrifice the privacy of their health information when using a hospital’s website,” said Melanie Fontes Rainer, OCR Director. “OCR continues to be concerned about impermissible disclosures of health information to third parties and will use all of its resources to address this issue.”
The two agencies sent the joint letter to approximately 130 hospital systems and telehealth providers to alert them about the risks and concerns about the use of technologies, such as the Meta/Facebook pixel and Google Analytics, that can track a user’s online activities. These tracking technologies gather identifiable information about users, usually without their knowledge and in ways that are hard for users to avoid, as users interact with a website or mobile app.
In their letter, both agencies reiterated the risks posed by the unauthorized disclosure of an individual’s personal health information to third parties. For example, the disclosure of such information could reveal sensitive information including health conditions, diagnoses, medications, medical treatments, frequency of visits to health care professionals, and where an individual seeks medical treatment.
HHS highlighted these concerns in a bulletin it issued late last year that reminded entities covered by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of their responsibilities to protect health data from unauthorized disclosure under the law.
Companies not covered by HIPAA still have a responsibility to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of personal health information—even when a third party developed their website or mobile app. Through its recent enforcement actions against BetterHelp, GoodRx and Premom, as well as recent guidance from the FTC’s Office of Technology, the FTC has put companies on notice that they must monitor the flow of health information to third parties that use tracking technologies integrated into websites and apps. The unauthorized disclosure of such information may violate the FTC Act and could constitute a breach of security under the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule.
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